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THE BELATED DECLINE OF LITERALISM IN
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DOCTRINE:
Soft Deception and the Rule of Law
William H. Simon*
Literalism is the doctrine that a facially accurate
but knowingly deceptive statement does not violate
prohibitions of falsehood and misrepresentation. This
essay argues that Literalism has had greater legitimacy in
professional responsibility than in other areas of law, but
that it seems to be in terminal decline. It surveys the
arguments for and against Literalism and concludes that
its impending demise should be welcomed.
I. Literalism v. Contextualism
-- In the course of a divorce trial, the husband testifies
that he acquired certain property as trustee for his mother:
Judge: [to Husband on the stand]: Where is your
mother?
Husband: In Salem
Husband's lawyer knows that the statement is true only in
the sense that the mother is buried in Salem. If the judge
or Wife's counsel understood that the mother had died,
further questions would bring out that the Husband had
inherited the property, which would be highly material to
the Wife's claims for support and property division.
Husband's counsel, however, takes no action with respect
to his client's response.1
*
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Alan Hyde and participants in discussions at Fordham and Columbia.
1
In re A, 276 Or. 225, 554 P.2d 479 (1976).
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-- Banking regulators ask a Savings and Loan
Association to produce underwriting files for specified
loans. With the knowledge of counsel, bank officers
produce files which have been labeled with the names of
the loans but to which some documents have been added
and others removed since the time of the loan
commitment. This is inconsistent with customary recordkeeping practice.
Counsel does not mention the
alterations to the regulators.2
-- A wrongful death action is brought against a drug
company by the survivors of an asthmatic child. The
child died after taking, in the course of a viral infection, a
drug made by the defendant. The company denies that it
had sufficient knowledge of danger from the drug to have
had any duty to warn the child's physician. The trade
name of the drug is Somophyllin Oral Liquid; its active
ingredient is theophyllin. In discovery, plaintiff demands
production of
"[A]ll documents pertaining to any
warning letter regarding the use of the drug Somophyllin
Oral Liquid." Defendant's counsel responds that there
were no such letters, even though they are aware of a
letter referring to "life threatening toxicity when pediatric
asthmatics on theophyllin contract viral infections." The
letter, however, made did not mention the trade name
Somophyllin Oral Liquid.3
*
2

In re Fischbein et al., OTS AP 92-19, par.s 74-93 (1992)
(reporting allegations of Office of Thrift Supervision), reprinted in
Practising Law Institute, The Attorney-Client Relationship After
Kaye, Scholer 237, 257-62, 272-86 (1992).
The allegations
mentioned above represent one of seven charges of deceptive
conduct, all disputed by the lawyers.
3
Washington State Physicians’ Insurance Co. v. Fisons, 858
P.2d 1054, 1079-84 (Wash. 1993).
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Each of these cases led to professional
responsibility charges, and in each counsel relied on
literalistic interpretations of his duties. Under a literalistic
approach, an actor's response is adequate as long as it is
not misleading under any of the meanings that can be
nonfrivolously attributed to it. The range of eligible
meanings includes those that are independent of the
context of the response and thus rely mainly on the
surface or dictionary meaning of the words. The first
lawyer is thus free to rely on an interpretation of the
judge's questions as concerned only with the mother's
physical whereabouts; the second is free to treat the bank
examiner's request as asking for the documents that
happen to be in the files at the moment; and the third can
respond as if the plaintiff was asking only for information
pertaining to theophyllin drugs with a particular trade
name.
Literalism is a response to asymmetric ambiguity.
The professional responsibility issues with which it is
concerned most often involve someone asking for
information (the "asker") and someone responding to a
request or demand for it (the "responder"). The responder
is making a statement that she is aware has more than one
non-frivolous interpretation.
The asker may have
introduced the ambiguity through an imprecision in her
request or question. It is likely that the asker is unaware
of the ambiguity precisely because she has less
information about the subject than the responder.
Moreover, in the situation with which we are concerned,
the ambiguity arises from a divergence between a literal
and a contextual meaning. The distinction is a matter of
degree. All meanings are contextual, but a literal
interpretation disregards all but a minimal range of
context. A contextual interpretation takes in the entire
range of factors that can be conveniently taken account of.
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In such situations, Literalism stands for two
points. First, it puts the costs of ambiguity and the burden
of clarification on the asker. Second, it accords as much
respect to literal or surface interpretations as to
substantive or contextual ones. The responder is as free
to rely on the former as on the latter.4
A competing approach to Literalism might be
called contextual, purposive, or substantive. An example
of a substantive approach is the fraud standard of the
Restatement 2d of Torts, which includes this:
A representation that the maker knows to
be capable of two interpretations, one of which he
knows to be false and the other true is fraudulent if
it is made:
(a) with the intention that it be understood
in the sense in which it is false, or
(b) without any belief or expectation as to
how it will be understood, or
(c) with reckless indifference as to how it
will be understood.5
The touchstone here is the addressee's
understanding, which makes context relevant. Note also
that the speaker who is aware of ambiguity -- the
responder in our case -- has a very high burden of
clarification. Not only is he not free to rely on
interpretations that he knows the addressee will not
assume, but he cannot rely even on interpretations that it
appears the addressee might not assume. If there is
ambiguity, he must clarify it if he speaks.
4

E.g., David E. Kendall et al., Preliminary Memorandum
Concerning Referral of Office of Independent Counsel, reprinted in
The Starr Report 355, 402 (Washington Post 1998) ("If answers are
truthful or literally truthful but misleading, there is no perjury as a
matter of law, no matter how misleading the testimony is or is
intended to be. The law simply does not require the witness to aid his
interrogator.")
5
Restatement 2d of Torts 527.
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Under a Contextual approach such as the
Restatement's, the three scenarios are easy cases. Counsel
in the divorce cases knows that the judge is likely to
understand "In Salem" to mean that the mother is living in
Salem. Counsel in the bank examination is at least
recklessly indifferent to the prospect that the examiners
will interpret their response to mean that the documents in
the files were there at the time of the loan decision and
that the files contain all the documents on which the
decisions were based. Defense counsel in the drug case
know that plaintiff's counsel intends its request to include
drugs that are medically equivalent to the one in issue
regardless of trade name, and hence knows that its
response will be understood to mean that there are no
documents with respect to any such drugs.6
In the remainder of this paper, I suggest that
Literalism has remained far more influential in
professional responsibility than it has in other fields, but
that it seems to be declining. I then rehearse the
arguments for and against Literalism and try to
substantiate the widely shared intuition that it is
pernicious.
II. Literalism Outside and Inside Professional
Responsibility
A. Outside

6

Of course, in a Literalistic regime, the asker will try to make
her questions unambiguous and will be attentive to literalistic
interpretations. To the extent that these efforts are successful, the
main difference from the asker’s point of view between a Literalistic
and a Contextual regime is that she has to work harder under the
latter. However, it seems likely that such efforts will have only
limited success and that askers will inadvertently assume mistaken
interpretations under Literalism.
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Outside Professional Responsibility, a powerful
tendency in American legal thought has been to move
away from Literalism toward Contextualism. Hostility to
literalism is prominent in the work of all the most highly
regarded modern jurisprudes from Cardozo to Dworkin.
In private law doctrine, Contextualism had triumphed by
the mid-twentieth century. I've already quoted the
contextual standard of the Restatement 2d of Torts on
fraud. Both the Restatement 2d of Contracts and the
Uniform Commercial Code mandate contextual
interpretation of contract terms.7
The Restatement 2d of Contract's provisions on
deception and mistake repudiate Literalism in precisely
the kind of situation we are concerned with. “Half
truths”, as well as explicit falsehoods, can warrant
recission.8 When one contracting party has "reason to
know" that the second party attaches a different meaning
to a term than she and the second is unaware of the
divergence, the second party's meaning controls.9 Where
one party "has reason to know" that the second's manifest
agreement is premised on a material mistake of the
second party, the contract is not binding on the other
party. For example, if a prospective sub-contractor has
submitted a bid that is based on an arithmetical
miscalculation reasonably observable by the general
contractor, the sub-contractor is not bound.10
7

Restatement 2d of Contracts, sec.s 159, 153(b), 201; UCC
sec. 1-201(3) ("agreement" found, as well as "in … language," also
"by implication from other circumstances including course of dealing
or usage of trade or course of performance").
8
Sec. 159; e.g., Comment b, Illustration 4 (seller of
apartment house who represents that apartments rent for $400 without
also disclosing that these rents are illegal under the rent control law
makes actionable misrepresentation).
9
Sec. 201(2).
10
Sec. 153(b), Illustration 9.
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In civil procedure, the Federal Rules reject
literalism at several points. For example: "Denials shall
fairly meet the substance of the averments denied."11
"[A]n evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or
response [in discovery] is to be treated as a failure to
disclose, answer, and respond."12
Literalism seems to have a stronger presence in
criminal law. At most, however, it is a one-way role.
Some authority allows the defendant to appeal to
Literalism where a statute is clumsily drafted or the
government pleads inadequately or the prosecutor asks an
ambiguous question on cross-examination. On the other
hand, the government's obligations to the defendant are
defined and interpreted contextually. The government's
Brady obligation to turn over exculpatory evidence, for
example, does not require a specific, unambiguous
demand by the defendant. The government must make its
own judgment about materiality, on a contextual
understanding, and then volunteer the information.13
11

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(b).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(3).
13
On Brady duties, see Wayne R. Lafave, Jerold Israel, and
Nancy King, Criminal Procedure 1098-1107 (3d ed. 2000).
A notorious prosecutorial reliance on Literalism occurred in
the examination of Captain Proctor, the ballistics expert, in the trial of
Sacco and Vanzetti:
Q: Have you an opinion as to whether bullet no. 3 … was
fired from the Colt automatic, which is in evidence [Sacco’s pistol]?
A: I have.
Q: And what is your opinion?
A: My opinion is that it is consistent with being fired from
that pistol.
After the conviction, Proctor conceded to the defense that “[a]t no
time was I able to find any evidence whatsover which tended to
convince me that the particular model bullet found in Bardelli’s body
… came from Sacco’s pistol” and that the prosecutor had framed the
question in order to avoid eliciting a negative answer. Neither the
trial court nor the appeals court found any problem with the
12
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Moreover, even pro-defendant literalism has
eroded in the criminal sphere. Cases in the perjury area,
for example, are divided. In the Bronston case, much
invoked by President Clinton's lawyers in the Lewinsky
affair, the Supreme Court reversed a perjury conviction
based on the following exchange:
Q: Do you have any bank accounts in Swiss
banks, Mr. Bronston?
A: No, sir.
Q: Have you ever?
A: The company had an account there for about
six months in Zurich.14
The answer was misleading; the examiner interpreted it to
mean that the witness had had not had a personal account,
and in fact he had. But the Court held it noncriminal,
insofar as it referred explicitly only to the corporation, it
was literally true.
However, in other cases involving misleadingly
ambiguous answers, convictions have been upheld. For
example, the Fifth Circuit upheld a conviction based on a
series of exchanges such as this:

prosecutor’s conduct. Felix Frankfurter, The Case of Sacco and
Vanzetti 77-78, 81-82, 89 (1927)
However, I doubt that anyone would defend it today. See,
for example, Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 31 (1957), in which the
Court, per Justice Frankfurter, found a due process violation in the
prosectuor’s knowing elicitation of testimony which, “taken as a
whole conveyed [a] false impression”. (The witness denied that he
was “in love” with the victim or had had “dates” with her, which he
and the prosecutor apparently believed to be literally true, while both
knew that the witness had had sexual intercourse with her on several
occasions.)
14
Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 354 (1973)
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Q: Didn’t you meet with a lady at a hotel here in
New Orleans on several occasions when you came down?
A: No. I did not.
The answer was true under the "literal" interpretation of
"New Orleans" to mean within the legal boundaries of the
city, since the meeting took place in the adjacent
jurisdiction of Kenner, but the answer was false under the
interpretation of "New Orleans" to mean the New Orleans
metropolitan area, which context indicated was the one
intended by the examiner.15
Aside from perjury, criminal offenses for
deception rarely require literal falsity. Criminal fraud
doctrine, like civil fraud, has evolved away from
literalism.16 And as Stuart Green concludes, with the
newer, more specialized statutory offenses, such as mail

15

United States v. Fulbright, 804 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1986); see
also United States v. DeZarn 157 F.3d 1042,
(6th Cir. 1998) (in
perjury case falsity is measured in terms of the “context of the
questioning”). These cases distinguish Bronston by the fact that there
the answer was unresponsive on its face. The prosecutor asked about
individual bank accounts, and the witness responded in terms of
corporate bank accounts. Had the prosecutor been attentive, she
would have followed up by insisting on an specific answer about
individual accounts. (Of course, one could say in Fulbright and
DeZarn that, had the prosecutor been attentive, she would have made
her initial question less ambiguous.)
One litigation situation where Contextualism has long been
uncontroversial is the common practice of asking questions on crossexamination in the form: “Isn’t it true that x?” The answer “yes” is
invariably interpreted to mean that x is true, notwithstanding that the
literal meaning is the opposite. Lawyers would never think of trying
to get some advantage by appealing to this literal meaning.
Contextual interpretation is so entrenched here that lawyers are no
longer aware of the literal interpretation.
16
Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law 743-44 (3d ed. 2000).
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or securities fraud, “literal falsity is seldom, if ever,
required.”17
The popular attitude toward literalism seems to
have remained the one depicted by Shakespeare in The
Merchant of Venice. Literalism, as exemplified by
Shylock's insistence on holding Antonio to his promise of
a pound of flesh, is presumptively deplored. It is
defensible and admirable only when used as a last resort
to thwart some substantive injustice, as with Portia's
counter-move based on a Literalistic interpretation of
"flesh" to mean only skin and not blood.18
The Literalistic defenses of President Clinton
against the perjury charges appear to have been met
largely with contempt. Clinton's lawyers argued that the
answer that Clinton had not had sex with Monica
Lewinsky was true under the lengthy written definition of
"sex" the Jones lawyers had filed. Clinton also argued
that his ordinary language understanding of "sex" did not
include oral sex. These arguments did not seem to
persuade many.19 People tended to scoff or (if they were
17

Stuart Green, “Lying, Misleading, and Falsey Denying: How
Moral Concepts Inform the law of Perjury, Fraud, and False
Statements,” Hastings Law Journal (forthcoming) (at 27 in ms.)
18
Shylock proposes the bond "in merry sport," I, iii, 146, then
when Antonio defaults, insists on literal enforcement. Portia
responds that "the words expressly" give him rights only to flesh, not
blood. IV, i, 308.
19
See Clinton v. Jones, 36 F.Supp.3d 1118, 1130 (E.D.Ark.
1999) (Wright, J.) (dismissing Clinton’s arguments based on
“tortured definitions and interpretations of the term ‘sexual
relations””); Robert Novack, “The Triumph of the Hairsplitters,”
New York Post, Jan. 25, 1999, at A27 (reporting popular disdain for
President’s “legalistic” arguments); Patrick Oster, “Kill the
Lawyers?”, National Law Journal, August 21, 1998, at A20 (same).
There were two main arguments about discovery answers.
First, Clinton denied that he had had “sexual relations” with any
federal employee in response to an interrogatory that did not define
the term. His defense was that “sexual relations” requires
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sympathetic on other grounds) wink at them. Clinton's
Congressional defenders did not rely on these points.
Even within a Literalistic perspective, Clinton's
arguments were debatable. A careful reading of the
plaintiff's definition does not support Clinton's
interpretation, but the verbiage is dense, and it is quite
plausible that someone relying only on this language
could have been confused. Judge Wright expressed
concern at the time of the deposition that the the
definition was hard to follow and that President might not
understand it.20 Ordinary language usage of "sex" in the
abstract seems to vary with respect to whether it includes
oral sex; Lewinsky used the word at least once on the
Tripp tapes in a way that excluded oral sex.21
If the questions are viewed in the broader context
of the Jones litigation, however, there can be no question
that the Jones lawyers meant their questions to cover
fellatio. The Jones lawyers were looking for conduct that
resembled what Jones alleged occurred with her in the
“intercourse” and does not include oral sex. Starr Report, cited in
note , 157-58, 174-76.
Second, during the depostion he was asked the same
question after being given a definition that stipulated that “a person
engages in ‘sexual relations’ when the person knowingly engages in
or causes…contact with the genitalia, anus, groin breasts, inner thigh,
or buttocks of any person with an intent to arouse or gratify sexual
desire of any person.” Starr Report, cited in note , at 158. In effect,
Clinton’s defenders argued that the definition applies only where a
person causes contact with a specified body part of another person
and only for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of
the other person. As Judge Wright characterized Clinton’s position:
“It appears that the President is asserting that Ms. Lewinsky could
have been having sex with him while, at the same time, he was not
having sex with her.” 36 F. Supp.2d at 1130 n.16.
20
Jones v. Clinton, Civil Action No. LR-C-94-290 (D. Ark.),
Deposition of William Jefferson Clinton, Jan. 17, 1998; transcript on
file with author.
21
H.R. Doc. No. 105-316, at 2664 (1998).
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Arkansas hotel room. The conduct Jones alleged looks
more than anything like a request for fellatio. So if the
standard is contextual, Clinton's defense is preposterous.
Its general dismissal in popular discussion tends to
confirm that popular morality applies a Contextual
standard.
B. In Professional Responsibility
Literalism has never been rejected in professional
responsibility as decisively as in general doctrine and
popular morality. True, it has often been criticized by
individual lawyers. Marvin Frankel's 1975 article "The
Search for Truth" is a widely noted example.22 But
lawyers as a group have not come close to renunciation of
it. It has remained a respected, though contested,
mainstream position.
The vitality of Literalism is most readily observed
in the criminal sphere.
Here, respectable opinion
defends even some form of active deception, and no doubt
such views would accept the more passive form involved
in Literalism. In the civil sphere, there is little discussion
or authority squarely addressing the choice between
Literalism and Contextualism. Nevertheless, the cases
with which we began suggest that the influence of
Literalism, though waning, is far from exhausted.
Lawyers were sanctioned in all three cases.23 But two of
them -- Kaye Scholer, the bank case; and Fisons, the drug
case -- were highly controversial within the bar and, to
some extent, continue to be.
The Kaye Scholer lawyers responded to the OTS
charges of deception, including the one concerning
22

Marvin Frankel, “The Search for Truth: An Umpireal
View,” 123 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1031 (1975).
23
In the banking case, the lawyers agreed to pay a fine to settle
the case prior to adjudication of the merits.
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document production described above, by appealing to
Literalism. With the support of Geoffrey Hazard, the
reporter for the ABA Model Rules, they argued that the
standard for judging their behavior was Model Rule of
Professional Responsibility 3.1 on "Meritorious Claims
and Contentions", which requires only that a statement
have a “basis … that is not frivolous.”24 As applied to
argument or the assertion of legal conclusions on the basis
of matters of record in an adjudicatory proceeding, the
non-frivolous standard is uncontroversial. The danger of
misleading ambiguity in this area is small, since the basis
for the statements is in view of everyone. But Hazard's
assertion that the non-frivolous standard of Rule 3.1
applied to factual statements in informal dealings
amounted to a radical assertion of Literalism in situations
where the potential for misleading ambiguity is pervasive.
He suggested that it didn't matter whether the Kaye
Scholer lawyers knew their responses were misleadingly
incomplete or intended that they be so, so long as there
was some interpretation under which the statements were
non-frivolous, he implied.
A chorus of bar leaders and institutions offered
vigorous support for Kaye Scholer after the OTS charges.
It is difficult, however, to distinguish the extent to which
the support was premised on acceptance of the firm's
Literalist position on the misrepresentation charges.
Much of the support was focused on an unusually
aggressive remedy OTS employed at the outset of the
case -- a "freeze" of the firm's assets under the banking
24

“Summary of Opinion of Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.” reprinted
in Practising Law Institute, cited in note , at
. Hazard ignored
what would seem to be the more directly pertinent prohibitions
against making “a false statement of material fact” of Model Rules
3.3 and 4.1.
No doubt he found it hard to argue that
“misprepresentation” should be given a Literalist reading here, when
tort authority so strongly supports a Contextualist one.
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laws. And when discussion reached the merits it often
portrayed the charges inaccurately (for example, as
complaining of nondisclosure rather than misleading
disclosure) and responded confusingly. Nevertheless,
none of the supporters made any effort to distance
themselves from Kaye Scholer's Literalist arguments.25
Particularly notable in this respect was Marvin Frankel,
perhaps the most famous critic of literalism, who
endorsed Kaye Scholer's position without qualification in
an op-ed piece.26
Fisons was less discussed than Kaye Scholer, but
the proceedings did produce some indication of lawyer
support for Literalism. Unlike Kaye Scholer, in which
OTS's misconduct claim was based substantially on
professional responsibility norms, the plaintiff's charges
in Fisons alleged only a violation of the discovery
provisions of the civil procedure rules. However, the
defense lawyers invoked professional responsibility
norms in their response. They argued that the civil
procedure rules should not be interpreted to impose
requirements inconsistent with professional responsibility
norms and that professional responsibility norms either
forbade or did not require turning over even clearly
material and important documents in response to an
ambiguous request. They were able to support this claim
with opinions from no less than fourteen ethics experts,
including two former presidents of the Washington bar
and (again) Geoffrey Hazard. In denying sanctions, the
trial judge found withholding the document “was
25

The response to the Kaye Scholer charges is described in
William H. Simon, “The Kaye Scholer Affair: The Lawyer’s Duty of
Candor and the Bar’s Temptations of Evasion and Apology,” 23 Law
& Social Inquiry 243, 259-82 (1998).
26
Marvin Frankel, “Lawyers Can’t Be Stool Pigeons,” New
York Times March 14, 1992, at A25, col. 6. Frankel seems to have
misunderstood the charges, and it’s not clear he intended to endorse
the Literalist aspects of Kaye Scholer’s defense.
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consistent with the customary and accepted litigation
practices of Snohomish County and of this state.”27 In
overruling, the Washington Supreme Court did not
dispute this finding; it just treated it as irrelevant. In
effect, it indicated that it wanted the customary practices
to change.
Literalism thus appears to retain substantial
support within the bar. On the other hand, our three
cases, and some others28, raise the question whether the
position is eroding. Cases like In Re A ("Where is your
mother?") that preclude Literalist deception in responses
to a judge seem not to have provoked protest.29 Although
Fisons provoked a strong Literalist defense in the lower
court, the state Supreme Court's repudiation of Literalism
in the discovery context, though widely noted, has met
with little open criticism. OTS's challenge in the banking
context was technically a stand-off; it was never decided
on the merits. But the massive defense of Kaye Scholer
focused mainly on issues other than the ones involving
Literalism, and some professional responsibility textbooks
now report the charges with some sympathy.
C. The Relevance of the New Formalism and
Texualism in Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation
27

858 P.2d at 1078 (appellate opinion reporting trial court
disposition); Stuart Taylor, Jr., “Sleazy in Seattle,” American Lawyer
(April 1994) at 74 (describing Fison’s expert supporters).
28
E.g., United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir.
1964) (Friendly, J.) (upholding criminal convictions of lawyer and
accountant under the securities law for various implicit
misprepresentations; e.g. “The statements that certain assets had not
been ‘verified by direct communication’ implied that with this
qualification all assets had been verified by suitable means; they had
not been.”)
29
See also Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116N.W.2d 704 (1962)
(approving vacation of judicial approval of settlement on behalf of
minor where opposing counsel failed to volunteer material
information to court).
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We should consider whether my portrayal of a
steady decline of Literalism in the general legal culture
requires qualification by virtue of the recent emergence of
a large body of argument in favor of “textualism” or
“formalism” in the interpretation of constitutions and
statutes.30 It is not clear to what extent these arguments
bear on the “Literalist” position on the issue we are
concerned with – the interpretation of statements by
individuals under duties to provide information.
In important respects, the constitutional and
statutory arguments seem different. Many of the new
Textualists or Formalists disclaim Literalism and insist on
their openness to a significant range of contextual
interpretation.31 Moreover, many of them value text or
form as evidence of either the intention of the law-maker
or the probable understanding of the addressee. By
contrast, our Literalists are indifferent to both the
responder’s intention and the asker’s understanding.
Finally, Textualists and Formalists believe that there is
usually a single best interpretation of the statement in
question, and their prescriptions are designed to identify
it. Literalists, on the other hand, insist that within a broad
range one understanding is as good as another. (Indeed,
the term Literalism is somewhat misleading, since
Literalists are happy to permit the responder to rely on
Contextual interpretation when it suits her purposes.)
While Textualist and Formalists tend to have a strict or
essentialist attitude toward interpretation, the Literalist
attitude is anarchic.
30

E.g., Symposium: “Formalism Revisited,” 66 University of
Chicago Law Review 527 (1999).
31
See John Manning, “Textualism as a Nondelegation
Doctrine,” 97 Columbia Law Review 673, 696 (1997) (“Textualism is
not literalism.”); Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 24 (1997)
(“good textualist” is not a literalist).
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Nevertheless, there is some kinship between the
two orientations.
Textualists and Formalists often
proceed from a libertarian orientation; they value their
methods as ways to constrain state power. As we will
discuss below, some of the arguments in support of
Literalism also seem to support it as a means of limiting
official intervention.
(However, Textualists and
Formalists are most focused on public law situations
where the state confronts private citizens directly, while
Literalism is more concerned with private law situations
where private citizens are disputing with each other. The
Libertarian perspective seems more salient in the latter.)
There is, in addition, an affinity between the argument
made by John Manning that Textualism functions to
induce the legislature to clarify its statutes32 and the
Literalist position that seeks to encourage the asker to
reduce the ambiguity of her requests.
On balance, the new Textualism and Formalism
might be seen as a reversal of the trend away from
Literalism, but only a small one that provides only slight
support for the professional responsibility positions we
are considering
III. The Case Against Literalism
It seems worth trying to set out the best arguments
for and against Literalism. The conclusion that Literalism
should be rejected will not be surprising. But neither the
arguments for nor the ones against Literalism have been
clearly articulated. So even if a review of them produces
no novel conclusion, it may add some confidence to the
disposition to reject it.
I focus on situations where the responder knows
what information the asker is seeking, and has no
32

Manning, cited in note .
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principled objection to providing it aside from the
ambiguity of the question or request. Thus, I am less
interested in situations where we may be sympathetic to
the responder because the asker threatens some
substantive right. For example, she seeks to invade the
responder’s privacy, or to deprive her of an economic
return on information she has invested resources in
developing, or to force her to incriminate herself. There
are important arguments in such situations in favor
deception, explicit or implicit.33 Although I occasionally
refer to such situations, especially Clinton’s testimony
about sex with Lewinsky, I intend to bracket questions of
the defensibility of deception tourt court and consider
simply whether a literally true but knowingly deceptive
response should be deemed legitimate where a literally
false one would not be.
A. Core Objections
There are three principal arguments against
literalism.
A. Deception
Literalism is a form of deception. From the
responder's point of view, literalistic deception is
distinguishable because the responder is more passive
than the actor in core cases of deception. Nevertheless,
she is not entirely passive; she does speak in a knowingly
misleading way. And from the asker's point of view, the
effect is the same as in the core case. The asker is misled.
Thus, the basic moral objections to deception seem
33

See, e.g., William H. Simon, “Virtuous Lying: A Critique of
Quasi-Categorical Moralism,” 13 Georgetown Journal of Legal
Ethics 433 (1999).
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applicable here: It is a failure of both respect and
solidarity.
B. The Rule of Law
Literalism is in tension with rule-of-law values.
The rule of law prescribes that disputes be resolved and
social conduct governed in accordance with duly
promulgated legal norms.
Such resolution and
governance requires that enforcers have material
information available to them. Literalism threatens this
pre-requisite by permitting the withholding of material
information.
The problem arises from dispersal of information.
People have material information not available to others
that it is not in their interests to disclose. Literalism puts
a high burden on the party seeking the information to
specify her demand. However, precisely because she
does not have the information, she is in an inferior
position to do so. A contextual rule puts the burden of
resolving ambiguity on the person who is in the best
position to do so -- the one who has the information.
Thus, a contextual norm produces more material
information, and this serves the rule of law.
The rule-of-law value bears on transactional as
well as litigation practice. The Rule of Law is designed to
protect autonomy, and the fullest exercise of autonmy
within legally prescribed boundaries requires that
transacting parties have the information that is material to
them.
A related point can be made in efficiency terms.
Access to material information generally makes for better
adjudicative and transactional decisions. Assigning the
duty to clarify ambiguity to the party with the most
information is a lower cost way of making material
information available to enforcers and transactors.
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C. The Adversary System
The third argument asserts that the contextual
understanding is most compatible with the desirable
features of the adversary system as we practice it.
Some use the adversary system as a trump that
favors any position that puts client loyalty above
nonclient interests. But if we look for connotations that
are both well-established in our system and distinguish it
from other systems (notably those of the civil law
countries), we find that the adversary system stands
primarily for the principle of party autonomy. Under this
principle, basic responsibility for defining issues and
presenting evidence belongs to the parties and their
counsel, rather than to public officials. One virtue
claimed for this approach is that it increases the chance
that the adjudicator will give fair consideration to all
relevant points of view. The presence of competing
advocates asserting their perspectives throughout the
proceeding prevents the adjudicator from allowing
preconceptions developed early on from dulling her
sensitivity to inconsistent evidence. Another virtue is that
parties are more likely to regard as legitimate a decision
that follows consideration of the arguments and evidence
they have chosen to present.34
So viewed, the virtues of the adversary system
depend on shared party control over the presentation of
evidence to the trier. They do not depend at all on a
party’s unilateral control over the other’s access to
evidence. Quite the contrary. Meaningful control over
presentation requires that each counsel have full access to
34
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the evidence that she might find relevant. Neither full
consideration of points of view nor legitimacy can be
achieved unless each party has had and believes that he
has has had full access. This suggests both that discovery
rights should be broad and that such rights should be
interpreted in the perspective of the asker. The responder
is not in a position to make an objective judgment about
materiality, but even if she were, such a judgment is
beside the point. The key thing is that each party have an
opportunity to present the evidence that she regards as
probative. No doubt safeguards against unreasonable and
bad faith demands are needed. But Literalism goes much
farther. It justifies the responder in disregarding the
asker's intentions whenever there is ambiguity in her
request. This is contrary to the spirit of party autonomy,
and thus, the adversary system.
B. Responses and Rebuttals
Here's how Literalism responds to the three
criticisms and why the responses are unconvincing:
A. Deception
Literalists often assert that the asker is
“responsible” for his own deception where the statement
is literally true.35 Sometimes they add that the asker
could have asked a clearer question or followed-up. This
distinguishes the express deception case only by degree,
since there are always some measures that the asker can
take to verify any statement. The measures may be less
35
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costly on average with implicit deception, but the
question remains why the asker should be expected to
undertake any more effort than necessary to communicate
her intention.
Perhaps the Literalists believe that the asker
should suffer for disrespecting some social convention
about reasonable inferences. If someone relied on a
plainly unreasonable interpretation of a statement I made,
convention might accept my failure to correct it. (Say,
she inferred from my saying I was from Texas that I was
wealthy and lent me money in reliance.) But there
doesn’t seem to be any categorical social convention
against reliance on contextual interpretation. On the
contrary, the norms exemplified by the Restatements
clearly assume that mistaken interpretation of literally
true statements is often reasonable.
A better argument is that implicit deception is less
blameworthy than implicit deception because the deceiver
is less active and because the victim’s sense of betrayal
will be weaker.
The claim rests on the
omission/commission distinction that, though sometimes
hard to justify in principle, has strong support in intuition
and convention. But conceding the premise that explicit
deception is worse does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that implicit deception is acceptable. The
contextualist can still contend that implicit deception is
bad enough to warrant prohibition, and we’ve seen that, at
least in the civil sphere, there is ample support in
substantive law for this notion.
If we ask why implicit deception seems less bad,
the answer is likely to be that it is closer to the situation
where the subject is entirely silent. Here the subject is
simply a bystander who knows that another suffers from a
misunderstanding. Yet, even in this situation, many
would aruge that there ought to be a “duty to rescue” if
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the subject can spare the other major loss without
incurring substantial cost herself.
The “duty to rescue” is strongest where aid is
costless to the subject. In our situation, there is a cost –
the information damages the responder’s position in the
litigation or negotiation. If the responder can point to
some defect in the process that will be exacerbated by
disclosure, this might be a morally relevant cost. But if
we concede that disclosure generally enhances the
likelihood of a fair resolution (for reasons adduced in the
rule-of-law and adversary system arguments), then the
cost seems morally irrelvant. Increased vulnerability to a
disadvantageous but fair decision should not count against
disclosure.
Whatever we conclude about the duty to rescue in
the bystander situation, that situation seems remote from
ours. The responder has usually placed himself in a
relation with the asker in which he is actively seeking
some advantage. He is himself seeking information from
the asker, as well as making demands on or proposals to
him. In the transactional context, he is bargaining for a
relation with or benefit from the asker. In litigation, the
plaintiff has initiated the proceeding by making
allegations. The defendant may be an involuntary
participant in some respects (although the case may arise
out of his past voluntary conduct), but once the case is
initiated, he does not remain a bystander; he takes
positions on the merits and makes allegations of his own.
B. Rule of Law
There are two Literalist responses worth
considering here. One asserts that Contextualism will
undermine accurate determinations by deterring adequate
preparation. Another asserts that it unfairly subjects the
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responder to uncertainty regarding his duties in particular
situations.
The argument about preparation asserts that the
stronger the duties to turn over adverse information, the
less effort lawyers will spend preparing their own clients'
cases. They will become lazy about preparation and will
overestimate the degree of help they can expect from their
adversaries and miss important evidence.
Overall,
preparation will be suboptimal, and adjudication will be
less reliable.
This is unconvincing. To begin with, only a
lawyer could conflate less lawyering with less efficiency.
Other things being equal, less lawyering means more
efficiency. Surely, it means more efficiency to the extent
that less lawyering takes the form of less duplication of
effort, more allocation of discovery burdens to parties
with easiest access to evidence, and less effort spent
anticipating and responding to opportunism and
recalcitrance on the part of opposing parties.
The Clinton deposition is a good example. The
Jones lawyers assumed that they might be operating under
a Literalism standard or that Clinton's lawyers would
assume that. So they spent a lot of time drafting an
elaborate definition of "sexual relations." According to
Clinton, however, they didn't spend enough time, they
failed to anticipate and eliminate all the ambiguities.
Indeed, Clinton's response raises the question
whether it is sometimes impossible to satisfy a Literalist
standard.36 Many who have parsed the Jones lawyers'
definition say that it really did preclude the ambiguity
about whether fellatio was "sex" that Clinton appealed
36
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to.37 But Clinton also suggested that he simply didn't
understand the definition. And of course, the more
elaborate and complicated the question gets, the more
plausibly the witness can claim not to understand it.
On the other hand, if they could have anticipated
that Clinton's duty to answer would be defined
Contextually, the Jones lawyers could have saved
themselves all the effort that went into framing the
question and simply asked about "sexual relations"
without elaboration. In context, no one would have
doubted that they intended to cover oral sex (the focus of
Jones's own allegations). The elimination of this kind of
defensive lawyering under a Contextual regime would be
a clear efficiency gain.
Of course, a reduction in lawyering is a clear
efficiency gain only if there is no reduction in the amount
and quality of information generated. In fact, we might
expect an increase in information under a Contextual
standard from the lessened ability to take advantage of
ambiguity to withhold adverse material.
Clinton's
prevarication might never have been discovered but for
Linda Tripp's enterprising tape recording, and the Fisons
"smoking gun" came forth only by the grace of a
whistleblower. Neither contingency seems especially
common. People will be tempted to withhold adverse
information if they think they can get away with it
regardless of the rules. However, if there is either
voluntary compliance or a credible sanction threat (and
surely there is), one might expect a contextual standard to
produce more information because it makes it easier to
demand it.
Nevertheless, lawyers who dislike strong
disclosure duties argue that there will a reduction in the
37
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amount and quality produced because lawyers, once they
become accustomed to relying on their adversaries to
make their cases, will become lazy and naïve and fail to
make adequate efforts on their own. The argument does
not make much sense, however. If disclosure duties
under a contextual standard are perfectly enforced, then it
will be both rational and socially desirable for lawyers to
reduce their efforts. To the extent that they are not
enforced, lawyers will be aware of that fact and will make
more effort than in a world of perfect enforcement,
though still probably less than in a literalist world. Under
any set of disclosure rules, lawyers will have to make
judgments about the optimal level of effort to spend on
preparation. There is no reason to think that these
judgments will be less sound under less burdensome
discovery procedures.
The other Literalist response on rule-of-law
concerns claims that Contextualism subjects the responder
to too much uncertainty about his responsibilities, and
hence, liability. The Supreme Court rested its Literalist
interpretation of the perjury statute on this consideration
in Bronston:
To [reject Literalism] would be to inject a
new and confusing element into the adversary
testimonial system we know, Witnesses would be
unsure to the extent of their responsibility for the
misunderstandings
and
inadequacies
of
examiners….38
Even in the context of a criminal perjury
prosecution the point is debatable. There may be more
uncertainy in general about what compliance requires
under a Contextual than under a Literalist standard, but
requirements under a Contextual standard would often be
clear enough. Some cases are ambiguous only in the
38
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sense that it is not clear that the responder is obliged to
interpret the request contextually. Once we know that a
contextual standard applies, cases like the three with
which we began are easy. Under any standard, a criminal
conviction for perjury would require proof beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant had knowingly
misled. Where this requirement is not satisfied, the court
should reverse for insufficient evidence. Where it is
satsified, an additional requirement of Literalism does not
seem to add anything of value.
More importantly, whatever plausbility the
argument has in the perjury context depends on the
asymmetry of stakes peculiar to criminal prosecution. We
deem erroenous conviction far more costly than
errnoenous acquittal.
But there is no comparable
asymmetry in the civil sphere. There it is a fatal objection
that whatever certainty Literalism adds for the responder
must come at the expense of greater uncertainty for the
asker. The diminished risk of mistaken sanction for the
responder requires an increased risk of loss of material
information, and hence mistaken determination on the
merits, for the asker.
C. The Adversary System
Justice Scalia's argument against the 1993 Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure amendments requiring
production without demand of adverse information are
pertinent to the debate about literalism:
The proposed new regime does not fit
comfortably within the American judicial system
which relies on adversarial litigation to develop
the facts before a neutral decisionmaker. By
placing upon lawyers the obligation to disclose
information damaging to their clients -- on their
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own initiative and in a context where the lines
between what must be disclosed and what need
not be disclosed are not clear but require the
exercise of considerable judgment -- the new Rule
would place intolerable strain upon lawyers'
ethical duty to represent their clients and not to
assist the opposing side….39
We must overlook the hyperbole here. If a duty is
inconsistent with the adversary system simply because it
benefits the opposing side, then we have never had an
adversary system.
Even before modern discovery,
lawyers had duties, such as the prohibition on lying and
presenting false evidence, designed to benefit opposing
parties. Of course, the modern discovery rules, which
govern what has come to be the principal litigation
activity in our system, consists entirely of duties intended
to benefit opposing parties.
However, Justice Scalia’s remarks seem to
suggest, in addition to the certainy point we dismissed
above, two further specific arguments:
(1) Argument: Judgments under a contextual
standard are especially difficult because they require the
lawyer to take the opposing party's point of view. I
suggested above that the adversary system encourages
this in discovery by prescribing that each party have
access to the evidence he believes is relevant. But clearly
it also contemplates that the lawyer take his own client's
point of view in preparing and presenting the case at trial.
Thus, it requires the lawyer to shift back and forth
between opposing points of view. Scalia suggests that
lawyers would have difficulty doing this and that the
adversary system implies that client loyalty prevail.
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(April 27, 1993).

This argument, however, misunderstands
lawyering, as it is practiced even under an ethic of strong
client loyalty.
As Anthony Kronman recently
emphasized, the traditional self-image of the profession
has emphasized, not just identification with, but also
detachment from clients.40 Not client loyalty alone, but
this simultaneous sympathy and detachment constitutes
the distinctive trait of effective lawyering. The lawyer
seeks to benefit the client by inducing trust and reliance in
others. The lawyer could not perform this role if she were
not able to understand the perspective of public officials
and adverse parties. The "cardinal rule' in John W. Davis
famous article on advocacy is, not, Identify with the
Client!, but, "Change places (in your imagination of
course) with the Court."41 Roger Fisher and William Ury
insist, “The ability to see the situation as the other side
sees it … is one of the most important skills a negotiator
can possess.”42
(2) Argument: It is demoralizing to force lawyer's
to take actions that benefit interests adverse to their
clients, and it is especially demoralizing to require them
to exercise their professional skills in some challenging
way for the benefit of nonclients.
Stress and demoralization are costs worth taking
account of, but we do not usually regard them as
sufficient objections to a social practice that produces
substantial benefits. No doubt police officers find it
40
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stressful to give Miranda warnings or to cease
interrogations when a suspect asks for a lawyer, but no
one would think this a sufficient reason to eliminate these
duties.
Moreover, the benefits of disclosure compliance
may have a compensating tendency to enhance morale.
The more confident we are that the case has been
determined on the basis of all relevant information, the
more reason we have to think that justice has been done.
The lawyer who wins after disclosing adverse information
should take that much more satisfaction in his work. The
lawyer who loses should have the consolation that the
result was more likely a just one. The lawyer who wins
knowing that material adverse information has been
withheld should feel stress from the knowledge that he
may have participated in an injustice.
No doubt lawyers experience more stress from
having to disclose information damaging to their clients
than they do from having to conceal such information
even when it is material. And perhaps this asymmetry is
inevitable. But there is nothing desirable about such
feelings and no reason to encourage them.
D. Lawyering is Not a Game
The last refuge of arguments for aggressive
lawyering is the claim that lawyering is a game and that
deception and concealment are part of the rules.
Deceptive lawyering is, like bluffing in poker, permissible
because everyone expects and accepts it.
It is
procedurally fair because the opportunities to deceive and
conceal are available to everyone. And both historically
and semantically, the adversary system has always
connoted a role for strategic cleverness, even at the cost
of obfuscation.
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It is undeniable that game rhetoric and attitudes
have always appealed to some lawyers. It is easy to see
why. The game perspective puts the lawyers’ technical
skills at the center of the picture and makes them an end
in themselves. It’s natural for lawyers to take satisfaction
in the products of their own cleverness. This view,
however, has had little appeal to lay people. Moreover, it
is indefensible as an ethical basis for practical
decisionmaking.
The game perspective is hard to criticize because
it is rarely articulted reflectively, but we can note two
important features of games that make them an
inappropriate analogy to the legal process.
First, people usually play games voluntarily and
for fun. By contrast, people have to enter the legal
process to pursue and preserve basic social and economic
goods. The fact that the rules are known and equally
applied may be a sufficient guarantee of fairness where
the costs of not playing are trivial, but where the stakes
and pressures to play are high, more is required.
Second, a game consists entirely of procedural
rules, and the only measure of fairness in a game is
compliance with those rules. But the legal process is a
means of law enforcement and application. Its exists in
substantial measure to vindicate the substantive law, and
substantive legal norms provide an independent measure
of the justice of its results. This is not to say that there is
no such thing as procedural fairness; just that procedural
fairness has to be compatible with substantive fairness. It
would make no sense to call fair a procedural system
deliberately designed to produce unfair results. A
lawyering practice that tends consistently to obfuscate
decision on the merits cannot be just simply because it is
subject to rules that are known and generally applied.
IV. Conclusion
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If the arguments for Literalism are so bad, how do
we account for the bar’s stubborn attachment to it? No
doubt sincere but mistaken belief in the arguments
rejected here are part of the explanation. No doubt the
natural psychological disposition of client loyalty also
figures strongly. But we should note that there is a
further, less flattering explanation. Literalism has at least
a modest correlation with the economic self-interest of the
bar. It is consistent with the bar’s perceived material
interest in minimizing the lawyer’s responsibilities to
people who do not pay for the lawyer’s services.
Moreover, it seems to have some tendency to enlarge
demand for legal services. Under a Literalist regime,
more lawyering is needed to produce any given amount of
information. While this is the opposite of efficiency from
a social point of view, it is in a material sense good for
lawyers.
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